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the post-cold war era is often seen as a 
historical period devoid of clear-cut, bal-
anced and objective military advice.1 How 
should military education and training sys-
tems then orient themselves in order to 
counter these? in other words, what didac-
tical principles are most useful as Wes-
tern forces enter unconventional battle-
fields? These questions arise because un-
conventional battlefields, i.e. in Ukraine, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria ”... rad-
ically contradict the institutionalized lan-
guage of control”; there are increasingly few 
military experiences that can be claimed to 
be universally true or of an objective na-
ture.2 On the contrary, as this article seeks 
to explore, employing Western conventio-
nal forces against unconventional oppo-
nents, in eastern europe, the middle east 
or Central Asia, may stir dissent, relativism 
and subjectivism rather than unity of pur-
pose and unity of command as far as mili-
tary education and training is concerned. 
this article will therefore evaluate the mil-
itary education and training systems from a 
NAtO and Norwegian perspective respec-
tively. The purpose is to increase our knowl-
edge of which pedagogical principles are the 
most useful as Western troops prepare them-
selves for the next war. The background for 
this endeavour is not only the peculiar mix 
of conventional and unconventional forc-
es as seen in russia’s hybrid warfare in-
side Ukraine.3 it is also the Western opera-
tions in Central Asia and the middle east, 
where conventional forces have strived to 
provide favourable political outcomes. in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and Syria, compel-
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Resumé 
Etter den kalde krigen har vestlige styrker stadig oftere blitt trukket inn i ukonvensjonelle 
kriger. En fellesnevner i slike operasjoner er at innøvde driller og prosedyrer sjelden er til-
passet omgivelsene. Dette kan forklares ved at vestlige styrker først og fremst er trent og ut-
dannet for konvensjonell krig mot andre lands styrker, som de russiske. Økt globalisering 
har imidlertid bidratt til å skape et mer sammensatt trusselbilde. I dette bildet avtegner det 
seg et større mangfold av aktører, intensjoner og kapabiliteter. Kriger som på én og sam-
me tid føres på konvensjonelt og ukonvensjonelt vis flyter over i hverandre. Ettersom stadig 
flere operasjoner gjennomføres innad i stater – ikke mellom stater – utfordres også de klas-
siske militærpedagogiske læringsstrategiene. Dette skaper større usikkerhet om hvilken pe-
dagogikk som gir mest relevant trening og utdanning. Å utdanne styrker som fungerer like 
godt i så vel konvensjonelle som ukonvensjonelle kriger, kan derfor vise seg å være en av de 
største utfordringene i fremtiden. Tett og vedvarende samarbeid mellom erfarne mentorer 
og «ferskere» studenter (soldater), i et bredt, tverrfaglig og internasjonalt miljø, viser seg å 
gi de beste soldatene. 
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ling empirical evidence signify all the hall-
marks of an unconventional battlefield. It is 
a theatre of operations characterised by un-
expected, unique and uncontrollable events. 
spurred by numerous improvised but sur-
prisingly efficient non-conventional capabil-
ities, unknown actors with unknown inten-
tions characterise the environment. 
tactical operations thereby tend to occur 
at short notice. initiated by opponents that 
operate autonomously, decentralised and 
with an asymmetric modus operandi and 
the absence of sufficient preparation time is 
more the rule than an exception. An asym-
metric modus operandi is defined in con-
trast to Western conventional forces, which 
tend to operate more centralised. However, 
under a strict unity of command, with a 
strict unity of purpose, pre-defined drills 
and rules of engagement, may impede ad-
aptation when fighting opponents with an 
asymmetric modus operandi. 
in the post-Cold War period, however, op-
erations have unfolded under circumstanc-
es that are not war in a conventional sense. 
instead, wars have increasingly been asso-
ciated with diffuse notions such as risks4 
or crises.5 Non-state actors have been the 
most common opponents. it leaves behind 
a number of questions related to who the 
actors actually are, what their intentions 
might be, and what capabilities they actu-
ally possess. 
How these unknowns – actors, intentions 
and capabilities – affect military pedagogy 
is the focus in this analysis. Why is this so; 
because unintended accidents or poor judge-
ments on unconventional battlefields seem 
to be a common theme? Among the most 
well-known examples are the US Marine 
Corps operation towards a Fallujah mosque 
in Iraq 2004; and the German request for 
US air support against incorrectly identified 
insurgents in Kunduz, Afghanistan 2009, 
leading to more than 90 civilian casualties. 
Which pedagogical principles are the most 
useful to prevent such tactical failures in the 
future? Responding quickly and intelligently 
on unconventional battlefields – more often 
than not without pre-defined routines, rele-
vant doctrines or tailored units – may there-
fore be worth scrutinising. modern forces 
are designed, trained and equipped to han-
dle unexpected events, at short notice with 
a high degree of professionalism; but still, 
Western military pedagogy struggles with 
unexpected events and how to add them to 
soldiers’ skill-set.6 
Previous Research 
In Germany, addressing the issues concern-
ing the unconventional battlefield has oc-
casionally been voiced by Ulrich Beck, who 
claimed ”we live, think and act in concepts 
that are historically obsolete but which 
nonetheless continue to govern our think-
ing and acting”.7 in scandinavia, Helgard 
mahrd has also discussed the issues, al-
beit in a more indirect manner. through 
her extensive analysis of Hannah Arendt’s 
works, “reflective judgements” and ”con-
cepts of politics” are used to describe the 
phenomenon.8 Anders McD Sookermany, 
emphasises the ontological and episte-
mological basis for military skill-acquisi-
tion, has also produced important works.9 
According to Sookermany, unexpected 
chains-of-events that tend to characterise 
unconventional battlefields are a key chal-
lenge to traditional military didactics. even 
though Western troops have transformed 
from a conscription-based force to a pro-
fessional one, adaption nevertheless seems 
difficult. Much of this can be attributed 
to an extremely conservative military cul-
ture. traditional deterrence and decisive 
battles towards other states’ conventional 
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forces seem to dominate military education 
and training. Symmetrical opponents (i.e. 
russian conventional forces with similar 
modus operandi and organisation) seem to 
be the preferred benchmark. Thus, analys-
ing the tactical outcome of this transforma-
tion, Jørgen W. Eriksens empirical works 
(2011) illustrate how traditional educa-
tional principles are challenged. As con-
ventional army units from the far north 
prepare themselves for Afghanistan, scho-
lastic education strategies dominate: first, a 
theoretical introduction in the classroom; 
thereafter, a final practical exercise in the 
field outside the barracks. Such pedagogy 
may be rational and stringent in its appear-
ance, but it may be unnecessarily rigid and 
rule-oriented. it may even preclude rapid 
adjustment between conventional and un-
conventional battlefields. Following a rigid 
set of pedagogic principles may also impe-
de a more dynamic environment for teach-
ing, learning and adaptation.10
A plausible interpretation of Beck, Mahrd, 
Sookermany and Eriksen may therefore indi-
cate that pedagogical reforms are necessary. 
Western forces need to rethink their didac-
tics. Non-scholastic methods, defined in its 
simplest terms as education based upon indi-
vidual experimental learning, often through 
close dialogue and reflection between stu-
dents and teachers therefore needs more at-
tention. preparation for the unconventional 
battlefield needs to focus on “what works and 
what does not work”. Non-scholastic meth-
ods emphasise authentic observations and 
contextual reflections ”here and now”.11
New perspectives and 
problem statements 
the abovementioned research, however, ig-
nores one fact; that “concepts of politics” 
and “military skill-acquisition” need to be 
contextualised. Operational challenges on 
the ground need to be refined all the way 
down to those who deal with the enemy. 
What impact may unknown actors, un-
known intentions and unknown capabili-
ties have on military pedagogics? to 
what extent is military education and train-
ing, which tends to emphasise other states’ 
con ventional forces, able to address uncon-
ventional forces? How may this ambiguity 
be addressed by updated pedagogical strat-
egies? Most scholars in the field of military 
pedagogics seem to ignore these questions. 
military pedagogics are therefore often an-
alysed in isolation from its fundamental 
problem; to deal with threats in ways that 
make political objectives attainable. 
the relevance of contextualising military 
pedagogics should be obvious. At the tacti-
cal level, didactic models – defined here in 
its simplest term as efforts trying to teach or 
instruct others – have proven inadequate in 
improving soldiers’ conventional mind-set. 
Pre-defined drills and doctrines often seem 
locked in by scholastic rules, too rigid to 
compete with a broad array of unknown ac-
tors such as in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya or 
syria.12 At the operational level, education 
and training shortages have come to the fore 
when staff officers employ forces towards 
opponents that change from a convention-
al to an unconventional modus operandi, 
such as in libya.13 Unexpected events like 
these seem to cause more chaos than suc-
cess, as the huge power-vacuum created by 
Western forces in libya illustrates.14 in ad-
dition, at the military-strategic level, gener-
als’ competence and professional authority 
are frequently questioned. Politicians often 
seem hugely disappointed by military intel-
ligence failures and inability to predict ”the 
unexpected”.15
Based on these assumptions, three ques-
tions arise: how can challenges to military 
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didactics be explained; how are these chal-
lenges spelled out in practice; and finally, 
what can be done about it? using empirical 
evidence from NAtO and the Norwegian 
Armed Forces, these 3 questions are ad-
dressed consecutively. 
How can didactical challenges 
be explained?
According to the prussian military theorist 
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), war’s 
nature is often described as a state of fear, 
chaos and uncertainty.16 the character-
istics, however, are constantly changing. 
Opponents’ tactics, their means and ends, 
often seem to fluctuate with the introduc-
tion of new technology, new knowledge, or 
a gradual change in belief- and value sys-
tems. Likewise, Western reasoning for em-
ploying force often changes from one his-
torical period to another.17 in contrast to 
the Cold War scenario of waging war to-
wards soviet mechanised formations, most 
wars of today take place inside states. They 
also often have a limited rather than an ex-
istential political purpose. 
these wars, which sometimes are called 
“improper wars” due to their political inde-
cisiveness, are often pursued far from own 
territory. most often, they are labelled sta-
bility operations or counter insurgency op-
erations (COIN).18 these wars often devel-
op through protracted campaigns – against 
actors that do not necessarily operate under 
a centralised state command (even though 
they can be, as in the case of iran’s support 
to Hezbollah or russia’s support to insur-
gents in Eastern Ukraine). Most often, they 
tend to operate autonomously, decentral-
ised and on an ad hoc basis. these actors, 
i.e. the Pasthu tribes in Faryab, Afghanistan, 
or the Misrata militias in Libya, find fertile 
ground inside collapsed states. under such 
circumstances, conventional forces with in-
sufficient flexibility in drills and procedures, 
often seems counter-productive. 
This is firstly because it is almost impos-
sible to create the conditions in where elu-
sive opponents can be compelled into a cor-
ner. A “proper war” – defined as a short and 
decisive conventional battle – can therefore 
not be achieved. A definite political outcome 
therefore has a slim chance for success. As 
many non-state actors operate without a uni-
fied chain of command, unexpected chains 
of events are likely to exceed the flexibili-
ty gained through pre-arranged doctrines 
and a rigid set of scholastic didactics. the 
problem often associated with non-state 
opponents is that they tend to trigger tac-
tical counter-reactions; these tend to occur 
as Western troops pursue pre-defined drills 
designed for conventional wars. this re-
sponse however, may often be unsuited to 
the local context. Counter-reactions often 
tend to trigger new counter-reactions and 
a subsequent chain of new uncontrollable 
events.19 this again may exaggerate the al-
ready existing social, political or econom-
ic grievance in theatre.20 At the next cross-
road, this dynamic may lead to a more cau-
tious approach: as Western troops become 
less confident, tactical initiatives and opera-
tional momentum may be lost. shortcomings 
in situational awareness and important de-
tails in the operational planning processes 
often tend to be the outcome.21 
As military didactics seek to produce more 
adaptive forces, pedagogical principles en-
ergising innovative ideas, creative thinking 
and diversity inside cohesive units have be-
come more important.22 Hence, implement-
ing new knowledge and experience into ex-
isting procedures is also one of the most de-
manding exercises for conventional forces. 
Why is this so? The question demands us to 
scrutinise the anatomy of unconventional 
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battlefields. Structural guidance is provid-
ed by the 3 variables that constitute con-
ventional forces’ threat assessments: actors, 
intentions and capabilities.
A myriad of actors 
based upon the empirical evidence from 
Western operations in Afghanistan23 and 
Iraq,24 it seems clear that actors cannot be 
dichotomised along a simplified “friend-
foe” axis. The diversity of actors operat-
ing on behalf of themselves or on behalf of 
their clan or tribe, do not only lead to sim-
plified and optimistic calculations of ex-
pected outcomes”.25 the myriad of oppor-
tunists and local power brokers also chal-
lenge the objective and unifying consensus 
that used to characterise military didactics; 
a battlefield where own troops could be 
trained to defeat a uniformed, disciplined 
and cohesive aggressor. indicators for this 
didactic are the binary causality between: 
”friends or foes”; ”peace or war”; ”us or 
them”; ”all or nothing” – inside a ”total 
war” context. As threats were clearly de-
fined, such an environment provided fer-
tile ground for rule-oriented and scholastic 
pedagogies. it may even be valid today, as 
long as opponents operate cohesively un-
der political control inside a centralised 
and disciplined chain of command. it al-
lows opponents to dress up with a distinct 
signature according to familiar and pre-de-
fined doctrines.26 
On unconventional battlefields, howev-
er, tactical operations are often triggered 
by unexpected counter-moves. more often 
than not, actors operate autonomously for 
a variety of reasons. they may even decide 
to change side or exploit the Western pres-
ence as a long-term profitable business. A 
common feature is nevertheless the bundle 
of unexpected courses of actions that, ac-
cording to Flynn, Pottinger and Batchelor, 
“serves to multiply our enemies rather than 
subtract them”.27 Orthodox didactical theo-
ry, most notably within the scholastic school 
of thought, may in this sense be too rigid 
to promote operational flexibility. As point-
ed out by Eriksen, different cultures, lan-
guages and other human factors present a 
“transfer problem” for Western forces that 
are employed into unfamiliar surroundings. 
this problem cannot be bridged by scholas-
tic predefined performance- or simulator-
based training at home.28 this argument is 
also underscored by a sociological school 
of thought, most notably in Beck’s risk so-
ciety concept, where educational models, it 
is argued, must be seen in a broader and 
more holistic context where opposing ac-
tors have become more mobile, volatile and 
abstract.29
A myriad of intentions 
As the number of actors increase, the myriad 
of intentions – defined as “motives for ac-
tion” – are also likely to multiply. Contrary 
to conventional battlefields, inten tions are 
no longer authorised throughout a disci-
plined or centralised chain of command. 
Hostile motives may thereby go beyond 
terri torial acquisitions and a much-want-
ed decisive battle. intentions may also be 
rela ted to warlords’ personal status, tribal 
pres tige or quest for revenge. Hostile ac-
tion may also be motivated by control of 
scarce resources. As motives increasingly 
relate to social, economic or political griev-
ances,30 military education and training be-
comes exposed to a broader set of subjec-
tive real-life experiences. this contrasts a 
conventional paradigm consisting of more 
or less rational calculations from state-cen-
tric actors.31 
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Depending on what soldiers and combat 
units have experienced, military organisa-
tions are likely to carry with them different 
knowledge. Countering rebel strongholds or 
individual power brokers’ influence is there-
fore likely to fuel different military respons-
es. each response may favour alternative di-
dactic models. it may therefore seem as if 
different contexts require different expertise. 
This again may require a broader spectre of 
didactic models. Among these could be ped-
agogical principles that embrace non-scho-
lastic models because they pay more tribute 
to unpredictable chains of events. 
A wider spectre of capabilities 
Finally, it may also be claimed that capabil-
ities can no longer be quantitatively defined 
within the narrow context of physical fig-
ures and numbers. the dynamic mixture of 
new actors and new intentions often leads 
to new capabilities. these are means that 
sometimes may generate as much political 
impact as Western conventional capabili-
ties. examples may be religious faith, local 
knowledge, ethnic support, cultural aware-
ness or language skills. Numerical prepon-
derance in aircraft, navy vessels or army 
units may, in this respect, be of lesser rele-
vance.32 On the contrary, experiences from 
Afghanistan and Iraq provide compelling 
evidence for more emphasis on qualitative 
or “softer” capabilities. Defined as cogni-
tive skills that energise actors’ ability to 
rapidly and continuously adapt to oppo-
nents’ courses of action, which are increas-
ingly improved as the war goes on. rather 
than emphasising mere combat skills based 
on scholastic pre-deployment training at 
home, more contextual competence could 
be built to enhance soldiers’ cognitive and 
contextual performance. Didactic theories 
that promote clear-cut and rule-orientated 
confrontation may therefore be challenged. 
Non-scholastic approaches that seek to 
improve flexibility outside a pre-defined 
framework of drills and procedures could 
be an alternative way. 
to sum up, the three variables actors, in-
tentions and capabilities are instrumental 
for how forces educate and train themselves. 
Contrasting the conventional Cold War para-
digm, the absence of clear-cut threats presents 
a fundamental challenge. this is particularly 
so for scholastic models that seek to address 
“the unforeseen”. An important question is 
therefore: where does this lead us? How is 
the balance between conventional and un-
conventional battlefields addressed inside 
conventional force structures? Are Western 
forces able to institutionalise effective skill-
acquisition mechanisms on unconventional 
battlefields? By exploring the multi-nation-
al level in NAtO and the national level in 
Norway, some tentative assumptions may 
be proposed. 
Why are NAtO and Norway chosen as 
cases? NATO has just accomplished its first 
Article V-operation in Afghanistan. this war 
lasted for more than a decade. the threat 
consisted of elusive actors with a myriad of 
intentions and capabilities. it is therefore of 
value to scrutinise the results while the em-
pirical data is still fresh. it may also be of 
relevance as NAtO refocuses its defence 
efforts towards some of the same challeng-
es in eastern europe. russia’s concept of 
“hybrid warfare” creates an unconvention-
al battlefield in Ukraine, and may as such 
have similarities with previous battlefields in 
Afghanistan. Choosing Norway as a case is 
somewhat more ambiguous. On the one hand, 
Norwegian forces are hardly representative 
of the broader spectrum of Western forces. 
the validity may therefore be of limited val-
ue. During the past decade however, Norway 
has become a middle-sized military power 
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in NAtO. Historically, Norway is regarded 
as one of the Alliance’s staunchest members, 
with forces that make a small state “punch 
above its weight”.33 the Norwegian case may 
therefore be representative for many small-
er states, which strive to adapt towards un-
conventional threats while also having con-
ventional battle skills in mind.
On didactic controversy 
based on the actor-intention-capability 
logic, it should not come as a surprise that 
scholastic and causal-oriented education 
models have become increasingly ambigu-
ous. On the one hand, Western politicians, 
i.e. in the scandinavian countries, expect 
their soldiers to perform quickly and in-
telligently on both conventional and un-
conventional battlefields.34 On the other 
hand, military organisations still seem to 
emphasise conventional operations based 
on a rule-based and scholastic education. 
this leaves little room for experimental 
learning in a “here-and-now” context.35 
balancing the two seems to be too demand-
ing. Challenges may be identified both at 
the multinational and national levels of 
analysis. How can this be explained? 
At the multinational level, empirical 
knowledge from NATO finds explanato-
ry support in the organisational school of 
thought. explanatory mechanisms devel-
oped by James G. March and Johan P. Olsen 
(1989) claim that large organisations tend to 
“freeze”; deeply rooted in the early years of 
an organisation, institutionalised patterns of 
behaviour become formative. How organi-
sations learn, adapt and eventually address 
new challenges tend to follow a sort of “path 
dependency”.36 this logic seems to be ap-
plicable to NAtO as the alliance was orig-
inally built to counter soviet conventional 
forces on a clearly defined European battle-
field. How pre-defined drills, standard oper-
ational procedures and war-fighting capabil-
ities adjust to non-European theatres – and 
generate new knowledge from unconven-
tional battlefields – has therefore become a 
key challenge. This again, as in the Afghan 
case, has significantly reduced NATO’s op-
erational relevance and even its legitimacy.37 
emilie simpson’s argument, that NAtO-
forces have little knowledge about the com-
plex mixture of actors, intentions, capabil-
ities in southern Afghanistan, and that “a 
traditional polarised view of the conflict” 
dominates the operational approach,38 finds 
fertile ground in march and Olsen’s per-
spectives. Here, NATO’s ”path dependen-
cy” from the Cold War leaves few incentives 
for more adaptive didactics, i.e. by means 
of non-scholastic experimental or “learn-
ing-in-doing”-approaches.39
At the national level, Norway’s retention of 
scholastic models finds support in the works 
by Philip Selznick. Inside a rational chain-of-
command, different sub-units have different 
roles and different responsibilities. land-, sea- 
and air forces have separate reasons to exist. 
the services are designed to accomplish dif-
ferent tasks with different capabilities. This 
variety often generates strong organisation-
al diversities. inside the various services and 
combat units; sub-cultures, norms, identi-
ties and even own agendas and hidden ob-
jectives thrive. sometimes these mechanisms 
coincide with official statements from the 
minister of Defence or the Chief of Defence. 
but more often than not, they create divi-
sion between “informal norms” and ”formal 
institutions”.40 While land forces operate in 
Afghanistan, naval forces operate against pi-
rates in the Gulf of Aden. At the same time, 
air forces deter Russian fighters along the 
Norwegian and baltic borders. these differ-
ing roles have a great impact on how serv-
ices and soldiers interpret threats, and how 
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threats are addressed didactically at home 
during pre-deployment exercises.41 
the two perspectives from NAtO and 
Norway are far from new. the American 
political scientist Graham Allison has never-
theless elegantly encapsulated them. Allison 
claims that ”Where you stand depends on 
where you sit”, meaning your organisational 
seating may often influence didactic stand-
points.42 How does this friction come in-
to practice, and how does it affect soldiers’ 
skill-acquisition? 
Skill-acquisition in NATO
Following a six-year “enemy-centric” strat-
egy in Afghanistan (2003–2009), ISAF’s 
key imperative was “... to adapt more dy-
namically in order to grasp the essence 
of previous lessons”.43 As NAtO strived 
to overcome the legacy of a conventional 
battlefield in Europe, the Afghan context 
seemed to challenge the causal correlation 
between violent destruction of the enemy 
and the political outcome in the country. 
NAtO-operations unfolded inside an en-
vironment where the combat performance 
was interpreted differently by various so-
cial and ethnic groups (actors). It led to 
numerous unexpected and uncontrolla-
ble chains of events. it ultimately contrib-
uted to undermine ISAF’s presence. This 
was, according to Emile Simpson (2012), 
because Western forces’ drills and doc-
trines communicated the wrong intentions. 
However, the rule-based education- and 
training system at home prescribed a con-
ventional military context that hardly went 
beyond physical destruction. As pointed 
out by Simpson, “[...] war does not there-
fore provide the strategists with an apoliti-
cal domain whose rules are fixed, within 
which the use of force relative to the en-
emy is the only variable which influences 
the outcome of war”.44 rather, the uncon-
ventional complexity – as described in the 
previous actor-intention-capability logic – 
stirred numerous individual meanings and 
subjective interpretations. the term mean-
ing, defined here as the local individuals’ 
personal perception of ISAF’s appearance, 
went beyond ISAF’s preoccupation with 
rule-oriented skill-acquisitions.
Different interpretations of how ISAF 
should conduct itself on operations also 
led to intra-allied discord. this again ham-
pered the troops’ adaptability and flexibility, 
particularly so in terms of how new knowl-
edge was exploited by more innovative and 
non-scholastic skill-acquisition models. The 
consequence seemed to be a dysfunctional 
learning-process. this again, it can be ar-
gued, has been detrimental for future con-
tingencies’ pre-deployment training.45 the 
empirical findings that underscore this per-
spective may indicate the following: pro-
ceeding beyond scholastic rigidity towards 
a more flexible “learning-in-doing-logic” is 
difficult. This is a great paradox as unex-
pected events on unconventional battlefields 
have been a primary undertaking for almost 
two decades; it has even acted as a compass 
for european defence reforms aiming to be-
come more relevant through an expedition-
ary design.46 Non-state actors seem, at least 
to some extent, to be spared from bureau-
cratic and inter-allied discord. Compared to 
NAtO, they seem to adapt more effective-
ly and rapidly. Contrasting NAtO-forces’ 
state-centric “friend-foe”-rationale and its 
subsequent rule-oriented didactic, non-state 
actors seems to be less tied to scholastic 
pre-defined rules and regulation. In terms 
of learning and adaptation, we may con-
clude that NAtO-forces seem to be worse 
off than their opponents are. 
It may also be argued that skills on un-
conventional battlefields are less vital than 
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conventional combat skills for national de-
fence within europe. the unwillingness to 
re-arrange education- and training facilities 
may therefore explain some of the reluctance 
towards so-called “out-of-area” operations. 
These sentiments may have intensified as 
Russia has become increasingly self-confi-
dent. NAtO’s strategic concept from 2010, 
which signalled that the Alliance should “re-
turn to its roots”, may have made the bal-
ance between conventional and unconven-
tional battlefields less important.47 
Skill-acquisition in Norway 
How can the national level be described? 
What is the main didactic controversy in-
side the Norwegian Armed Forces? Accord-
ing to Inge Kampenes (2011), the military 
Lessons Learned-regime builds on a 3-step 
logic. First, personal experiences from re-
turning veterans are written down. this is 
done either by an officer in charge or by 
an expert group that has been personally 
involved. second, the reports are sent to 
the Norwegian Operational Headquarters, 
which is tasked to scrutinise the content 
and decide what is important. based on 
this judgement, concrete action points are 
– most often – extracted. Third, the ac-
tion points are disseminated to education 
and training units that might have an in-
terest. the recipients are most often mil-
itary organisations at the lowest tactical 
level, with other personnel and institution-
al affiliations, for follow-up and preferably 
mitigation.48 
intuitively, this logic seems to follow a ra-
tional procedure in accordance with scho-
lastic deductions of pre-defined remedial 
action-points. Different people, at differ-
ent levels, nevertheless interpret the reports 
differently. some education- and training 
centres will find them useful and exploit 
them for further learning and experiment-
ing, while others will dislike them and ig-
nore them. some may not even care or even 
work against them. Again, “where you stand 
depends on where you sit”. In accordance 
with explanatory mechanisms briefly elabo-
rated on by March, Olsen and Seltznick, the 
Norwegian system seems to run into some of 
the same difficulties as NATO: the absence 
of unifying criteria for success throughout 
the chain-of-command; the absence of clear-
ly defined roles and responsibilities; and di-
verse contextual interpretation– all contrib-
ute to a so-called ”post-modern school of 
thought”. This school is often characterised 
by relativism and individual interpretations. 
this myriad of subjectivism impedes com-
bat units’ adaptability towards new experi-
ences and new knowledge.49 
this may in part be due to the absence of 
a unifying set of mutually reinforcing threat 
perceptions. more precisely, it means the ab-
sence of a conventional actor-intention-capa-
bility logic that constitutes a quantitative and 
objective fundament for cohesive and collec-
tive learning processes. However, it may al-
so be due to a post-modern absence of col-
lective and unifying benchmarks; standards 
that during the Cold War used to cement co-
hesive force structure across service branch-
es. As small european states are forced in-
to roles as providers of niche capabilities in 
US-led coalitions, collective benchmarks for 
objective lessons have faltered. Despite am-
bitious goals of thinking creatively “outside 
the box”, Norwegian sub-units tend to pre-
serve pre-defined rules, own regulations and 
individual procedures.50 
russian assertiveness in eastern europe, 
however, may have bolstered the convention-
al mind-set. the scholastic pedagogy used 
in military education and training may have 
impeded flexibility between conventional 
and unconventional battlefields. Norway’s 
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return to the far north , as a primary stra-
tegic area of interest since 2005,51 may as 
such contribute to explanations where un-
conventional battlefields and their adjacent 
pedagogics lose relevance, momentum and 
attention.
Conclusions 
in this article, the actor-intention-capabil-
ity logic has been used to visualise peda-
gogical challenges to soldiers’ skill-acqui-
sition on unconventional battlefields. It 
can be argued that two points have be-
come clear: (i) Western forces prefer to 
maintain scholastic and rule-oriented ap-
proaches even though operations on un-
conventional battlefields dominate; (ii) any 
didactical preparations for unconvention-
al battlefields seem to generate institution-
al ambiguity and friction. this controver-
sy seems to be evident at the multi-nation-
al and national level of analysis. the two 
points may be of interest as they contradict 
Ulrich Beck’s analysis, claiming that ene-
mies tend to unite societies, induce cohe-
siveness and ultimately bridge other soci-
etal divisions.52 this analysis has indicated 
the opposite. it has claimed that the most 
prevalent enemies after the Cold War have 
had a fragmented effect on military organi-
sations. Consequently, Western forces have 
been reactive and reluctant when it comes 
to changing their modus operandi after the 
Cold War. 
However, if the actor-intention-capabili-
ty logic is valid, one final question remains: 
what can be done about it? How can mil-
itary organisations counter the unpredict-
ability permeating 21st Century combat? 
based on the previous analysis, four prin-
ciples may be deduced and serve as prelim-
inary conclusions: Mentoring, networking, 
probing and experimenting. 
Mentoring
Closer and more persistent interaction be-
tween young skill-acquiring participants 
and mentors that are more experienced may 
overcome rule- and regulation based edu-
cation. Designed to reflect and elaborate 
on practical skills in small seminars, dis-
cussions of battlefield experiences may cre-
ate a more dynamic and innovative learn-
ing-process. This knowledge can be tested 
among participants – or students (soldiers) 
– in real-life operations. Thereafter, the ex-
periences can be reflected upon, concep-
tually refined, and re-funnelled into non-
scholastic seminars and pre-deployment 
training. this educational design promotes 
a more authentic context. it may also pay 
more attention to “here-and-now” situ-
ations. As such, it may contrast the more 
abstract narratives that pre-deployment 
training tends to emphasise before troops 
are sent to unconventional battlefields. 
Another argument is the following: cou-
pled with the students’ subjective conscious-
ness, mentors’ personal experiences may fa-
cilitate learning processes that are more open-
ended. it may allow soldiers to gain more 
knowledge because abstract concepts are val-
idated and empirically tested. Guided by a 
team of specially educated mentors, soldiers’ 
military units may even start to develop a 
common point of reference: a shared oper-
ational framework from where new experi-
ences and innovative knowledge ultimately 
leads to transformative performances. this 
is not due to individual or subjective state-
ments from strong individuals, which often 
set the premises for what is acceptable and 
what is unacceptable knowledge. On the 
contrary, as new experiences are deduced 
into more abstract, universal and long-term 
knowledge, it is because soldiers are allowed 
to share a common framework. 
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Mentors are however, like anyone else, 
biased. Prejudice often influences mentors’ 
knowledge and prejudice often stems from 
intense socialisation-processes. these mech-
anisms seem to thrive inside military rule- 
and regulation oriented cultures. Diversity 
among mentors is therefore crucial to over-
come stigma, politically correctness and ser-
vile discussions. this may be particularly so 
among career officers who are apprehen-
sive of sanctions further up in the chain-of-
command. it is therefore important to wid-
en the possible outcome for reflection and 
elaboration. Active mentoring may as such 
increase soldiers’ consciousness and subjec-
tive experience. these characteristics have 
often been neglected by scholastic pedagog-
ic because “emphasis to acquisition, manip-
ulation, and recall of abstract symbols” has 
dominated.53
Networking 
Diversity is firstly generated through net-
working – or “a community of practice”.54 
This network emerges between participants, 
mentors and students with different expe-
riences and perspectives. Associating own 
learning- and pedagogical models to other 
education- and training centres may there-
fore create a more dynamic “community 
of practice”. A common feature in these 
networks would be real-life diversity of 
knowledge. This is a kind of skill-acquisi-
tion that cannot be generated inside small-
er and isolated milieus at the tactical level. 
Volume is critical for creating knowledge, 
and small european forces may easily ex-
perience educational fragmentation rather 
than educational reinforcements through 
larger and more robust milieus. Hence, 
lack of real life experience may be a real 
challenge for smaller nations that seldom 
perceive national interests at stake far from 
own territories. Crucial input to soldiers’ 
skill-acquisition and learning processes at 
home may thereby be missed.55 
Clusters of mentors and students from 
various national and international institu-
tions may nevertheless challenge precon-
ceived perceptions. based on interdiscipli-
nary discussions on a regular basis, interac-
tion through discussions and practical field 
studies may be feasible. the pedagogical 
outcome may be a more dynamic knowl-
edge environment that takes a more dynam-
ic stance towards unexpected events on un-
conventional battlefields. 
Probing 
the various education- and training centres 
must, however, constantly probe other col-
leagues’ experiences and didactic methods. 
this method often seems to be the most ef-
fective incentive for continuous improve-
ments. As pointed out by Helgard mahrdt, 
“the art of conversation” is key for any po-
litical – and we may add military – judge-
ment.56 those education and training units 
that have no culture for probing ”what 
went wrong and what went well”, have 
slim prospects for success. As was point-
ed out by Sookermany and Beck, Western 
forces have become expeditionary in their 
nature. modern combat units are therefore 
expected to act intelligently to unforeseen 
events on short notice. it can therefore be 
argued that by demonstrating proactive 
probing as a normal habit – or even as an 
expected procedure – a more dynamic en-
vironment is likely to emerge. This again 
may make it easier to attract more inno-
vative mentors and students that are more 
open-minded. under such circumstances, 
pedagogical theory development and theo-
ry modelling will find fertile ground. 
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this principle may be instrumental be-
cause it challenges the conventional scho-
lastic principle of pursuing clearly defined 
learning-goals. As Western forces often tend 
to emphasise the net outcome of education 
and training programmes rather that the 
process leading up to improved perform-
ance, learning tend to lose authentic rele-
vance and become contextually detached. the 
key problem may be, according to Jennifer 
A. Moon, the neglect of “reflective learning 
phases”.57 As most Western forces confront 
an almost chronically resource-shortage, fo-
cus on outcome tends to be more important 
than learning processes. probing as a peda-
gogical principle may therefore provide add-
ed-value because it pays more attention to 
how soldiers learn rather that how training 
programmes should be. this logic is con-
sistent with the definition worked out by 
David A. Colb (1984), claiming “learning 
is the process whereby knowledge is creat-
ed through the transformation of experience. 
Knowledge results from the combination of 
grasping experience and transforming it”.58 
However, as Colb points out, the experienc-
es must be transformed in order to be of us-
able value. this leads us to the last principle, 
which is experimental learning. 
Experimenting 
As unforeseen chains-of-events cannot be 
predicted, skill-acquisition needs to stimu-
late a sort of learning where soldiers are al-
lowed to “try and fail”.59 by learning from 
personal errors and mistakes, non-scholas-
tic models that encourage the accumula-
tion of personal failures are likely to pre-
vail. the art of experimenting throughout 
military education and training is there-
fore neatly correlated to a culture of ques-
tioning. As any experimental action needs 
to be accompanied by ”reflective learning 
phases”,60 experiments and reflections 
could develop into more iterative and 
mutually reinforcing processes. this may, 
however, be a too ambitious goal for forc-
es that by and large tend to focus on the 
imminent performance in war. As pointed 
out by Alexander L. George, “whenever a 
war-threatening crisis erupts, military lead-
ers regard it as their most urgent task and 
highest priority to get ready to fight if war 
erupts”.61 
it may nevertheless be claimed that a more 
conscious use of the mentor-principle may 
make the goal attainable. By employing ex-
perienced non-commissioned officers as men-
tors for the younger or less experienced re-
cruits, older colleagues may create a more 
open-ended learning process. this is part-
ly achieved by asking the right questions to 
their younger comrades before, during and 
after a “try and fail” exercise. Partly also 
by assisting younger colleagues in deducing 
valid knowledge leading to empirically test-
ed and grounded conceptual clarity. 
the principle of experimenting is vital. its 
importance goes beyond educating soldiers 
with necessary self-confidence on unconven-
tional battlefields. Experimenting is about 
spearheading new educational reforms that 
challenge conservative cultures inside scho-
lastic and rule-oriented doctrines. soldiers 
and units that have had the privilege of build-
ing confidence, based on personal failures 
may therefore be key agents for a more di-
verse military pedagogic. this again, it can 
be argued, may challenge the didactic he-
gemony attached to Western preference for 
”a proper conventional war”. This does not 
only stir creative outcomes and more innova-
tive solutions on unconventional battlefields. 
it may also provide educational incentives 
for reforms that stir performances that are 
more flexible outside the box. pedagogical 
reforms may as such be the best remedy for 
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conventional forces operating on unconven-
tional battlefields in the 21st Century.
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